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THE YEAR 2007 marks the tenth anniversary of the first human fatality from 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, a three-year-old boy who died in Hong 
Kong. Epidemiologists have warned for some time that an influenza pan-
demic is practically certain to recur (Webster 1997; Webby and Webster 
2003 ). Smil (2005) ranked an influenza pandemic as the single most likely 
"transformational" catastrophe, that is, one with potential to change the 
course of history. 
In contrast, say, to their reaction to climate change, policymakers have 
not only quickly taken scientific fears to heart, but if anything have amplified 
them. US President George W. Bush called for broad latitude to deploy the US 
military in the fight against influenza. Andrew Natsios, then Administrator 
of the US Agency for International Development, declared avian influenza, 
a likely source of the next pandemic, the agency's main global priority, thus 
displacing, at a stroke, Iraq, Afghanistan, and HIV/AIDS. The editors of the 
opinion-leading journal Foreign Affairs committed the July I August 200 5 issue 
to the theme, whose staying power was confirmed by its return to the pages 
of the same journal two years later (Osterholm 2007) . At least in the United 
States, pandemic influenza has been packaged as a security issue, an area in 
which the exercise of sovereign power is a matter of survival. The very nature 
of the viral enemy, constantly mutating or "emerging," seems to call for a 
permanent state of mobilization. 
Is the level of concern about the next influenza pandemic justified? 
This review assesses the current state of knowledge regarding this potentially 
deadly event and the state of policy responses to it. 
Influenza 
Influenza is a respiratory infection caused by an RNA virus. 1 There are three 
main types of influenza virus (A, B, and C); A is the main cause of influenza 
in humans. Influenza A is further divided into subtypes on the basis of the 
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two classes of surface proteins comprising the outer coat of the virus-hemag-
glutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N). Virus subtypes are identified by the 
order in which the protein was discovered; for example, the subtypes now 
established in the human population are HlNl, HlN2, and H3N2. Although 
these proteins are attacked by the human immune system, new protein types 
allow the virus to escape the human body's defenses. Virus subtypes can, in 
turn, be subdivided into various strains. 
Influenza is a significant infectious disease killer even in normal years. 
In the United States, the "attack rate" (the proportion of the population expe-
riencing clinical symptoms of disease) in a normal influenza season is about 10 
percent. The human and economic costs, and the cost effectiveness of public 
health responses, particularly vaccination, have been assessed by public health 
experts (see Fedson 2003: 1532 for citations), although rigorous reviews find a 
wide gap between policy and the quality of the empirical evidence (Jefferson 
et al. 2005; Jefferson 2006). Studies suffer from multiple flaws, among which 
perhaps the most serious is nonrandomness: for example, extrapolation to 
the entire community of results from a study of nursing home residents, or 
to all flu seasons from evidence pertaining to a single year. 
Influenza virus is transmitted by direct contact with secretions, large 
droplets, and aerosols, each of which calls for its own response-hand wash-
ing, surgical masks, and respirators, respectively. Tellier (2006) has argued 
that aerosol transmission has been downplayed in pandemic preparedness 
planning, with two ominous implications: the public will be less protected 
than they think by mass wearing of surgical masks, and health professionals 
should be equipped with personal respirators, a step not foreseen in pandemic 
preparedness plans. 
Influenza is a seasonal disease concentrated in the cold months of the 
year in temperate zones and, less strongly, in wet and rainy seasons in tropi-
cal zones, although pandemics can emerge at any time during the year. The 
reasons for its seasonality remain unknown. 
Pandemic influenza: Emergence and spread 
Pandemic influenza refers to a situation in which a new and highly patho-
genic viral subtype, one to which no one (or few) in the human population 
has immunological resistance and which is easily transmissible between 
humans, establishes a foothold in the human population, at which point it 
rapidly spreads worldwide. Historically, influenza pandemics have struck, 
on average, every 28 years, with extreme values of 6 and 53 years. 2 In the 
twentieth century, there were three major pandemics (Lazzari and Stohr 
2004; Kilbourne 1987): 
-a severe one in 1918-20 ("Spanish flu," caused by the HlNl subtype) 
in which 20-40 million persons died in the space of 18 months, an estimate 
now viewed as conservative (Johnson and Mueller 2002) 3; 
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-a mild one in 1957-58 ("Asian flu," caused by the H2N2 subtype), in 
which excess mortality was about one million; 
-a mild one in 1968-69 ("Hong Kong flu," caused by the H3N2 sub-
type), when excess mortality was also on the order of one million.4 
In the 1918-20 and 1957-58 pandemics, infection rates on the order of 
50 percent and attack rates on the order of 25 percent were observed. Perhaps 
just as important as these three epidemics, when its impact on policy is con-
sidered, is the 197 6 swine flu epidemic, which failed to materialize after US 
policymakers had launched a mass vaccination campaign in anticipation. 
How do new influenza viruses appear? There are two processes by which 
the influenza A virus undergoes evolution: antigenic drift and antigenic shift. 
Drift is gradual; thus, influenza vaccine produced on the basis of last year's 
strain will likely confer reasonable protection if only drift has occurred. Pan-
demics are ascribed to antigenic shifts, which are abrupt variations leading 
to universal susceptibility to the disease. 5 A likely scenario for producing a 
shifted influenza strain is the combination of segments from a human virus 
and an avian virus, resulting in a reassortment of genetic material. One way 
for this to happen is for swine, susceptible to both human and avian influenza, 
to serve as an intermediary host in which reassortment can occur. Therefore, 
the coresidence of the "Three P's"-people, pigs, and poultry-in rural Asia is 
conducive to the emergence of pandemic influenza, leading some researchers 
to refer to this region (specifically, China) as an "influenza epicenter" (Hamp-
son 1997). Osterholm (2005a, 2005b) refers to Asia as "an incredible mixing 
vessel" for the production of new viruses. 
Current pandemic fears focus on the H5Nl variant of avian influenza, 
a disease of domestic and wild fowl that is now endemic among bird popu-
lations in Asia (Li et al. 2004) and is increasingly infecting humans (World 
Health Organization 2005a, 2005b; Writing Committee of the WHO 2005). 6 
Having started its existence as a relatively benign virus, H5Nl has evolved to 
be highly pathogenic to domestic fowl, leading to the term Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza. It may or may not make wildfowl sick, allowing them to 
spread the disease widely. Domestic ducks can also remain asymptomatic, 
making them an especially dangerous disease vector. Although H5Nl avian 
influenza emerged in Asia, migratory wildfowl have spread the disease to 
Russia, Turkey, Romania, Nigeria, Egypt, and other countries (including west-
ern European countries). The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), 
the international organization tasked with global animal health, has a clear 
protocol for the isolation and slaughter of infected flocks . Over 100 million 
birds have been slaughtered in Southeast Asia in recent years, at enormous 
economic cost and impact on poor farmers, yet the H5Nl virus is nowhere 
near being contained, let alone eradicated. 
The 1957 and 1968 pandemic viruses (H2N2 and H3N2) both arose from 
genetic reassortment. Some have found it encouraging, if mystifying, that 
H5Nl has not reassorted despite having had ample chance to do so (Stohr 
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2005) .7 Perhaps the viruses resulting from reassortment, if such has taken 
place, have been so benign as to escape notice. However, reassortment in an 
intermediary host is not necessary for the emergence of a pandemic strain. 
The deadly 1918 virus appears to have been an avian virus that adapted 
directly to humans (Taubenberger et al. 2005). This is disquietingly similar 
to what has been observed with H5Nl, which has infected humans directly, 
with no evidence of reassortment having occurred (World Health Organiza-
tion Global Influenza Program Surveillance Network 2005) . So far, H5Nl 
does not appear to be easily transmissible between humans, but this could 
change at any time. Or, the virus, having established a foyer in a geographi-
cally limited human population, could mutate gradually in the direction of 
greater human-to-human transmissibility. 
H5Nl was first observed in the human population in 1997, when it in-
fected 18 persons, six of whom died, in Hong Kong. This was the first known 
example of the direct transmission of influenza from birds to humans (Class 
et al. 1998). Since then, human cases have been observed mainly in China, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. All known cases of human avian influenza 
to date appear to represent bird-to-human transmission, with the exception 
of a few cases of person-to-person transmission at very close quarters (e.g., 
Ungchusak et al. 2005). No case of casual transmission via nasal aerosols has 
been confirmed, risks to health care workers appear to be modest, and blood 
tests of persons in contact with human avian influenza sufferers have been 
negative (Writing Committee of WHO 2005, especially Table 2).8 These facts 
suggest that the virus has not yet become broadly transmissible from human 
to human (Liem et al. 2005). However, if the virus attains the ability to pass 
easily between human hosts-and the H5Nl virus is known to mutate rap-
idly9-this will represent the beginning of a potentially catastrophic pandemic. 
The genetic changes necessary to adapt the H5Nl virus from avian to human 
receptors are minor (Harvey et al. 2004) .10 
The World Health Organization (2005a) has divided the influenza cycle 
into six phases, as shown in Figure 1. Based on this scheme, H5Nl influenza 
is in Phase 3, where some cases of person-to-person transmission have been 
observed, but human-to-human transmissibility is low. Some epidemiolo-
gists believe, however, that the true scope of H5Nl has not been recognized 
because of poor testing; that, in fact, H5Nl is well into Phase 4 or even Phase 
5 (see Henry Liman's «www.recombinomics.com» for this argument) . Even 
if this pessimistic view is incorrect, the World Health Organization has listed 
five points that give cause for grave concern (WHO 2005b): 
-H5Nl has spread rapidly among poultry in Asia and is now endemic 
to the region. (WHO might have added that H5Nl is now known to spread 
by migratory wildfowl.) 
-It mutates rapidly, as witnessed by its rising virulence in poultry. 
-It has acquired genes from influenza viruses that infect other species. 
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FIGURE 1 Six phases of the influenza cycle 
Inter-pandemic period 
Phase 1: No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An 
influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in 
animals. If present only in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is 
considered to be low. 
Phase 2: No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. 
However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk 
of human disease. 
Pandemic alert period 
Phase 3: Human infection(s) with a new subtype has been detected, but no 
human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact 
( nperson-to-person") . 
Phase 4: Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but 
spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to 
humans. 
Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, 
suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, 
but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk) . 
Pandemic period 
Phase 6: Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission has been detected in 
general population. 
-It is highly pathogenic in humans. 
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-The dangerous interaction of animal and human populations in Asia 
continues apace. 
Stohr (2005) writes that the warning signs of an imminent pandemic 
have never been higher since 1968; nearly five years ago, Webby and Webster 
(2003) derived the same conclusion from the cluster of avian-to-human influ-
enza transfers since 1997. However, the precise etiology of influenza pandem-
ics remains unknown and, as the 1976 swine flu episode demonstrates, the 
emergence of a novel influenza strain together with cases of animal-to-hu-
man transmission does not necessarily result in a pandemic (Dowdle 2006). 
Pandemic influenza: Clinical aspects 
Most strains of influenza do not kill the victim outright; rather, secondary 
infections such as pneumonia, treatable with antibiotics, are responsible for 
mortality. Pandemic influenza, by contrast, is characterized by a high preva-
lence of primary viral pneumonia (Ward et al. 2005). The 1918-20 viral strain 
was a strikingly efficient killer. Mortality arose from a "cytokine storm," an 
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immune system response leading to acute respiratory distress syndrome (Ko-
basa et al. 2004). Perhaps ominously, H5Nl hemagglutinin shares molecular 
characteristics with that of the 1 918 virus (Hatta et al. 2001). Laboratory 
animals infected with the H5Nl virus become far sicker than control-group 
animals infected with H3N2 (Ward et al. 2005: i7 for references). 
As of September 2006, the World Health Organization recognized 
309 human cases of avian influenza, of which 188 resulted in death. This 
case-fatality rate of over 50 percent is inflated because not all cases have 
been reported; however, even it is five times too high, it would rank with 
that of the 1918-20 virus. 11 There is no established clinical protocol for treat-
ment of the disease other than broad-spectrum antibiotics and the antiviral 
agents oseltamivir and zanamivir (Tamiflu and Relenza), manufactured by 
the pharmaceutical firms Roche and GSK respectively (see Ward et al. 2005 
on Tamiflu). The drugs appear to be of low efficacy if the infection is well 
established (Hien et al. 2004). Tamiflu may also be taken as post-exposure 
prophylaxis in a six-week course of 75 milligrams twice daily. Demand for 
Tamiflu has soared and Roche has broadly licensed governments and other 
firms to manufacture it. 12 
It is practically unavoidable, if arguably deplorable, that in public health, 
life-years at the extremes of the age spectrum are less valued than life-years 
in the middle range. The perceived severity of a pandemic will greatly depend 
on its age-attack curve, that is, the age groups at greatest risk. The typical age 
profile of influenza mortality is U-shaped, meaning the very young and the 
very old are at highest risk. In 1957-58, children were at greater risk than 
the aged, perhaps because older persons had some degree of immunologi-
cal protection from previous exposure to a similar strain. In 1968- 69, the 
very young and very old were equally at risk. The frightening specter of the 
1918-20 pandemic is in part attributable to the fact that attack rates followed 
an idiosyncratic W-shape-added to the traditional peaks at the extremes of 
the life span was a peak for young adults. 13 This completely atypical pattern 
remains a mystery (Taubenberger and Morens 2006). Stohr (2005) notes with 
concern that most cases of human H5Nl infection have been children and 
young adults, although this may in part have to do with their close contact 
with poultry in farmyards. 
The unlucky few who to date have suffered from Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza have infected only persons in very close contact with them 
because the H5Nl virus affects the lower respiratory tract, immediately lead-
ing to debilitating pneumonia. A mutation increasing human-to-human 
transmission probabilities might well see the virus affecting the upper respi-
ratory tract instead, with the welcome side effect of reducing pathogenicity 
(Smith 2006). In any event, it is not warranted to assume that pandemic 
influenza will be characterized by the astronomical case-fatality rates that 
have so far been observed in H5Nl Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. Nor 
should we assume that it will have an atypical age-attack curve. 
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Policy responses to pandemic influenza 
There is another reason to be at least moderately optimistic. In their review of 
the 1918 pandemic, citing improved response capabilities, Morens and Fauci 
(2007) are succinct: "Almost all 'then versus now' comparisons are encourag-
ing." Policies to respond to pandemic influenza fall into three time frames-
measures that can be taken before the emergence of a new virus, measures 
that can be undertaken in the immediate aftermath of its emergence, and 
measures that can be taken once the pandemic has been established. 
Under the lead of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
World Health Organization, and the World Organisation for Animal Health, 
a number of initiatives have been proposed to reduce the risk of Asian zoo-
noses (FAO and OIE 2005). Officials of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have even committed themselves to an ambitious effort to 
eradicate avian influenza. This strategy is unlikely to succeed given the en-
demic nature of the disease and the possibilities of long-range transmission by 
migratory wildfowl; however, the improvements in agricultural and market 
conditions resulting from the initiative, as well as the improved capacity for 
surveillance, represent steps in the right direction. Interventions affecting ag-
riculture and rural development have the distinct advantage of being win-win 
options-regardless of their impact on human influenza, they will improve 
the lives of many poor households, as well as those of farm animals. Indeed, 
the under-allocation of public health resources to veterinary health has been 
commonplace (Martinat et al. 2007). 
In the case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, isolation 
and quarantine measures were effective in stamping out the epidemic. Influ-
enza, however, is characterized by a much shorter incubation period, and the 
onset of infectiousness is known to occur before the onset of symptoms. The 
dangers of disease transmission were shown dramatically during the SARS 
epidemic when 16 persons on a single airline flight became ill. Air filters can 
reduce the likelihood of transmission (Pavia 2007). One study based on a 
stochastic model (Cooper 2005) found that travel restrictions would delay the 
international spread of pandemic influenza only if they were virtually instan-
taneous and 100 percent effective, which is exceedingly unlikely to be the 
case. Other studies lead to different conclusions; for example, some believe 
that restrictions on air travel following the September 11th, 2001 attacks re-
sulted in a mild influenza season (Brownstein et al. 2006). Yet, historical data 
suggest no change in the speed of influenza's spread over recent centuries, 
despite the massive proliferation in travel and human-to-human contact. 
Two high-profile micro-simulation studies concluded that rapid policy 
measures could successfully "ring-fence" influenza outbreaks within South-
east Asia (Ferguson et al. 2005; Longini et al. 2005). The main interven-
tion foreseen was targeted post-exposure prophylaxis with antiviral drugs, 
combined with "social distancing" (school and workplace closures, etc.) and 
436 PA ND EMIC I N FLU ENZ A: A REVIEW 
quarantine. Opinions differ: Monto (2006) takes the idea seriously; Mills et 
al. (2006) warn that, like forest fires, pandemics may represent the cumula-
tion of multiple outbreaks, effectively swamping any "ring-fence" strategy. 
The Lancet, in an editorial for 13 May 2006, was flatly dismissive of ring-fenc-
ing. Flauhault et al. (2006) used a different approach to assess strategies for 
reducing the impact of a pandemic assuming that it could not be ring-fenced 
and concluded that the combination of complementary measures, timing, 
and global coverage were key factors determining effectiveness. The use of 
mathematical modeling to design optimal response strategies is complicated 
by the fact that epidemiological dynamics can be perverse. If interventions to 
prevent transmission are too effective, a large number of susceptible persons 
are left in the population, leading to the likelihood of a second peak (Bootsma 
and Ferguson 2007). 
The value of the reproduction coefficient R0 is the key assumption in 
model simulations. R0 is the number of persons infected by each infectious 
individual in a completely immuno-naive population (i.e., at the onset of a 
pandemic; hence the subscript zero). As such, it is held to be a characteristic 
of the virus and the mixing characteristics of the population. R, by contrast, 
is the number of persons infected by an infectious person at a given point in 
time, and it declines as an epidemic progresses and growing numbers of per-
sons in the population acquire immunity. A simulation study for the United 
States suggested that for a relatively low R0 coefficient of 1.7, a stockpile of 10 
million courses of Tamiflu, twice the current US stockpile, would be required 
to keep the total attack rate below 10 percent (Germann et al. 2006) . For 
R0 = 1.9, by contrast, the required stockpile would be an astronomical 182 
million courses. R0 for pandemic influenza has been estimated, based on San 
Francisco data from autumn 1918, to be 2.0-3.0 at the city level (Chowell 
et al. 2007). 
The higher the R0, the greater the need for comprehensive approaches 
involving antivirals, vaccination, social distancing, and travel restrictions. 
The key to ring-fencing, though, is not implementing measures so much as 
targeting them. Wu et al. (2006) stress the need for aggressive contact trac-
ing and implementation of household protection measures, while McCaw 
and McVernon (2007) show the large payoff to proper targeting of antiviral 
prophylaxis. 
Ring-fencing an epidemic presupposes that the surveillance necessary 
to pinpoint the epidemic has taken place. The first line of defense against a 
pandemic is WHO's National Influenza Centers, of which there are 110 in 80 
countries (Hampson 1997). But centers in many poor countries lack equip-
ment and human capacity (Meijer 2006). Some countries in Southeast Asia 
(e.g., Laos and Cambodia) have virtually no epidemiological field surveillance 
capacity. Emergency technical assistance programs to put surveillance capacity 
in place are underway (for example, USAID has dispatched US$25 million to 
LANDIS MACKELLAR 437 
the region). Capacity building will be in vain, however, if reasonable public 
health governance is not in place (Calain 2007a). During the SARS episode, 
China incurred widespread disapprobation when Ministry of Health officials 
tried to cover up the epidemic. 14 A number of high-profile sackings and public 
commitments never again to engage in such behavior resulted, but old habits 
die hard. China's decision in 2006 to make press reporting of "unexpected 
occurrences" subject to criminal action is proof of this. Even if there is a com-
mitment to transparency at the center, implementation in the provinces may 
be weak. Throughout Southeast Asia, regardless of central government policy, 
farmers are reluctant to report epidemic outbreaks because compensation for 
slaughtered birds is low, and local officials are inclined to suppress the news 
because livelihoods are at stake. The keys to making surveillance work are ( 1) 
rewarding or at least reimbursing those whose flocks must be destroyed and 
(2) empowering those who surveil. Few countries are willing to do either. 
The control of infectious disease is a clear example of a health-related 
global public good (Smith et al. 2003 ), and supra-national collective action is 
required in areas ranging from surveillance and reporting to immunization. 
Much has been written on the globalization of disease, typically construed 
to mean heightened vulnerability to infectious disease. Much less has been 
written on the globalization of the response to disease. The remarkably ef-
fective global response to SARS, particularly the coordinated international 
laboratory effort, which saw the virus identified within a matter of weeks, 
gives cause for optimism. Since then, however, the emphasis on security as-
pects of infectious disease has led to perceptible tension and an atmosphere 
of confrontation, nowhere better illustrated than in Indonesia's temporary 
refusal to make virus strains available for analysis (Calain 2007b; Normile 
2007). Why, Indonesian policymakers reasoned (until they were placated), 
should we provide the raw material to develop vaccines that pharmaceutical 
firms will then sell at prices we cannot afford? The World Health Organiza-
tion, the lead international agency in this area, can set policies, but it has no 
power to implement or enforce them. At best it can act as an advocate for 
more vigorous policy response, but these policies are enacted by national 
governments and pharmaceutical firms. 
Once a pandemic is established, antiviral drugs will play a major role. 
The World Health Organization has issued clinical recommendations for the 
use of antivirals against H5Nl Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, but ac-
knowledges that because of the small number of cases, the evidence base is 
poor (WHO 2007). Nuno et al. (2007) advise that countries with limited anti-
viral stocks should use them only therapeutically; countries with large stocks 
should use them prophylactically as well. A major advantage of antivirals is 
that they will be effective from the very beginning of a pandemic, whereas 
efforts to develop and deliver a vaccine will take many months (Monto 2006), 
as described below. As vaccine efficacy and coverage increase, the effective-
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ness of antivirals to reduce morbidity and mortality increases pari passu. Thus, 
the idea that antivirals are only a stopgap measure to be applied early in the 
pandemic cycle is wrong. 
Some strains of the H5Nl virus are already resistant to another antiviral 
agent, adamantine, and despite arguments that oseltamivir is less subject to 
resistance (Ward et al. 2005 ), mildly resistant strains have already been found 
in a clinical setting (de Jong et al. 2005). The worst-case scenario is that a resis-
tant transmissible strain emerges, attempts to control use of the antiretroviral 
agent fail, nonresistant strains are killed off, and only the resistant strain is 
left in place. Yet simulations by Lipsitch et al. (2007) found that even when 
resistance emerges, widespread use of antivirals can significantly delay and 
reduce total morbidity and mortality. 
Vaccine development and administration would be a key response to a 
pandemic, but Fauci (2006) aptly described the entire pandemic influenza vac-
cine development and manufacturing process as "fragile." It is often pointed 
out that, using traditional approaches, it takes the global pharmaceutical 
industry six to eight months to develop an influenza vaccine from the time 
the viral strain to be protected against is isolated. As stated above, in normal 
years the genetic mutation from last year's virus is small. Thus, when patients 
are immunized with a vaccine based on last season's influenza strain, they are 
reasonably well protected against the strain that will be prevalent in coming 
months. These favorable conditions will not be present in the case of pandemic 
influenza: vaccine development would have to commence after the new virus 
had emerged and been identified. Given a lag of 6-8 months, the pandemic 
would already be globally established (Stohr and Esveld 2004) . One need not 
be overly pessimistic, however. While it takes the pharmaceutical industry 
6-8 months to fill an entire national order, significant batches of vaccine are 
available weeks or even months earlier. Pandemic spread is variable and tends 
to occur in waves. While a vaccine might have little impact on the first wave 
(particularly in the country or region of origin), its effectiveness in subsequent 
waves as they spread around the world might be considerably greater. 
Genetic engineering techniques ("reverse genetics") might permit sci-
entists to speed up vaccine development, allowing a vaccine to be developed 
within weeks after the viral strain had been identified (Webby et al. 2004). 
Reverse genetics raises issues of intellectual property rights, regulatory re-
gimes, and consumer acceptance (Web by and Webster 2003 ). 15 Early devel-
opment of candidate vaccines is another prudent step, and several candidate 
vaccines generated from H5 isolates have been under study for some time 
(Writing Committee of WHO 2005: 1383 for references) . Subbarao and Jo-
seph (2007), reviewing the difficulties of developing a vaccine against avian 
influenza, cite the importance of maintaining a "library" of candidate vac-
cines. The problem of removing the highly pathogenic component of the 
H5Nl virus has already been solved (Monto 2006). However, rapid muta-
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tion of the virus means that vaccines developed from currently known virus 
strains may not be effective when a new strain emerges. One of the main 
challenges is not vaccine development per se but minimizing the need for 
multiple vaccinations (ibid.) . The arithmetic is not complex: a given stock of 
vaccine requiring one immunization will make it possible to protect twice as 
many persons as a vaccine requiring two. The role of "adjuvants," substances 
that increase the potency of vaccines, will be crucial. 
Laboratory development of a vaccine will be only the beginning of the 
challenge. While high-value specialized vaccines (against human papilloma-
virus, for example) are a profitable line of business for pharmaceutical firms, 
commodity vaccines (basic vaccines administered to children, for example, 
or influenza vaccine) are not. Part of the reason is that the main customers 
are governments, which take little interest in public immunization programs 
(Fedson 2003, 2005; Hinman et al. 2006 ). It was to counter this general indif-
ference, and the resulting failure to meet WHO Enhanced Program of Immu-
nization (EPI) goals, that the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI) was established. Adding to the pharmaceutical industry's distaste for 
vaccines are memories of the 1976 US "swine flu" debacle, in which hun-
dreds of people suffered serious adverse effects from the mass vaccination 
program instituted. In the United States, Britain, and elsewhere in Europe, 
civil society groups opposing mass compulsory immunization have become 
a political force. 
Under these adverse conditions, it is perhaps not surprising that industry 
capacity to produce influenza vaccine is only about 300-350 million doses per 
year. 16 A chaotic situation can be foreseen in which major countries attempt 
to lock in supplies by negotiating forward contracts with individual suppliers. 
Osterholm (2005a) cites "1950s egg-based technology" and the lack of na-
tional commitment (in the United States) to universal influenza vaccination 
as major barriers to pandemic preparedness.17 His estimate is that supplies suf-
ficient to vaccinate 500 million persons against a new influenza strain might 
be available within six months of the beginning of a pandemic (this refers to 
conventional egg-derived unadjuvanted vaccine). Given the limited number 
of doses and the concentration of manufacturing capacity in fewer than a 
dozen countries, there will be thorny questions of how to allocate inadequate 
vaccine stocks. It is difficult to imagine national policymakers freeing vaccine 
from national stocks in order to vaccinate populations in greater need else-
where in the world. Poor and middle-income countries will be able to obtain 
vaccines (and antivirals) only by means of binding orders with pharmaceutical 
firms (if they have the money) or local production (if they have the capacity). 
Most have neither, and global institutions are ill-prepared to cope with the 
outcry that will follow. 
A number of authors have pointed out that the best way to prepare 
vaccination strategy (as well as production capacity) for a pandemic is to 
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increase inter-pandemic vaccination coverage. As of this writing, one of the 
easiest steps that could be taken to head off a pandemic would be vaccinating 
persons, especially those exposed to poultry, in areas where the HSNl avian 
influenza is endemic (to prevent the possibility of reassortment in a human 
host). Yet there is no serious effort to do this. 
A recent expert meeting convened by the World Health Organization 
on enhancing the vaccination response to pandemic influenza examined 
the entire range of options from novel vaccine development technologies to 
vaccine-sparing modes of injection. A summary of the meeting reports that 
an investment of US$3-10 billion might begin to bear fruit in three to five 
years (Kieny et al. 2006). Not considered by the World Health Organization, 
but another means of boosting effective supply, would be harmonization of 
regulatory standards among countries (Gronvall and Borio 2006). Perhaps 
most important, from an industry perspective, is the assurance that demand 
for vaccine will materialize. Existing capacity can be (and has been) expanded; 
even existing capacity and technology can produce far more vaccine than it 
currently does, but all of this requires that pharmaceutical firms have a high 
expectation of profit. 
One may envision not only vaccine (and antiviral) shortages, but a more 
general situation of distress throughout the health care system. Hospital beds, 
ventilators, surgical masks, and other equipment would be in short supply. 
Personnel problems would be felt as doctors, nurses, and hospital workers 
(or their families) became sick and missed work. An influenza pandemic is 
a classic "surge" problem, and public health systems have traditionally been 
unprepared for peak demand. Surge aspects aside, national public health sys-
tems are chronically underfunded (Garrett 2007), and they have retooled for 
health promotion rather than for the classic infectious disease control missions 
that they were originally mandated to carry out (MacDougall 2007) . 
Some 50 countries have responded to the call to devise pandemic pre-
paredness plans, but very few of these are operationally credible, even in 
Europe (Mounier-Jack and Coker 2006). A "checklist" approach, in which 
countries attempt to address the measures identified in the WHO national 
pandemic preparedness template, dominates. A survey of EU member coun-
tries led experts to conclude that countries were "moderately" well prepared, 
but this amounted to certifying that they had ticked off those boxes on the list 
that were identified by expert opinion as the most important. The specifica-
tion of audiences and objectives in the plans was found to be generally weak. 
Cross-border aspects of pandemic preparedness were conspicuously absent 
from national plans . 
In developing countries, planners meticulously enumerate interven-
tions, estimate target populations, set coverage targets, multiply by unit costs 
to calculate resource needs, and present international donors with their esti-
mates of the funding gap. Given the near collapse of public health systems in 
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many poor countries after decades of government indifference (and the un-
foreseen devastation of HIV/AIDS), the exercise appears divorced from reality. 
Nowhere is the gap wider between rhetoric, heavily tinged with off-the-shelf 
protocols and model policy guidelines, and grim reality. The World Health 
Organization, which answers to a board consisting of representatives named 
by governments, can hardly be expected to adopt a critical perspective. 
Demographic impacts of pandemic influenza 
The general public has scant appreciation of the lethality of pandemic influ-
enza (Kristiansen et al. 2007). Scaling up the global population in 1918 (1.8 
billion) to current levels, it is not inconceivable that 200 million or more 
persons would die in the event of a hyper-virulent pandemic. 18 
Whether the next pandemic will have a U- or a W-shaped mortality 
profile is essentially irrelevant to its overall toll-population growth alone 
since 1918 suggests that pandemic influenza has the potential to kill l 00-300 
million persons if the case-fatality rate is high enough. However, the age pro-
file of mortality could have a significant impact on population age structures 
and on age-based transfer systems such as pensions. A pandemic in which 
excess mortality among the working-age population exceeded excess mortal-
ity among the elderly (as in 1918-20) would worsen the problems currently 
faced by pension and health care finance systems. 
Equally important could be selective mortality. In the French heat wave 
of 2003, most heat-related deaths were among the frailest elderly (whose 
survival prospects were already poor), so the total person-years of life lost 
was less than what would have been expected by applying a population-
wide actuarial table to the age distribution of heat wave deaths. In the 1918 
pandemic, tuberculosis infection was one condition that enhanced mortal-
ity, so that TB death rates fell sharply after the epidemic-so many of the 
tuberculous died in 1918 that there were fewer left to die years later. Today, 
especially in developing countries, tuberculosis remains a highly prevalent 
disease, and similar selective mortality cannot be ruled out. Individuals with 
compromised cell-mediated immunity (those with HIV/AIDS, for instance) 
may likewise be highly affected by an influenza pandemic. The point is open 
to discussion, however: some have argued that an overly vigorous immune 
response to the virus (the "cytokine storm") caused the W-shaped 1918-20 
mortality profile, in which case the immuno-compromised might actually 
be better off. 
Links to fertility also need to be considered. For reasons not under-
stood, the 1918-20 pandemic was ruthlessly lethal to pregnant women. If 
a pandemic led to high mortality among women of childbearing age, the 
result might be a temporary drop in fertility. After the pandemic had passed 
its peak, fertility might rise above its long-term trend as parents sought to 
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replace lost children; alternatively, it might drop below its trend as a result of 
reduced economic expectations or lagged health effects of the pandemic. 
Economic impacts of pandemic influenza 
Like developing-world pandemic preparedness plans, estimates of the eco-
nomic costs of pandemic influenza are somewhat surreal, since the perceived 
loss will be more human than material. Nonetheless, and predictably, esti-
mates of economic impacts have played a large role in the attempt to mo-
bilize governments and the private sector in pandemic preparedness. Their 
magnitude, and whether their estimation rests on sensible approaches, are 
therefore not unimportant questions. For example, the authors of the ar-
ticles that appeared in the 2005 special issue of Foreign Affairs appeared to be 
unanimous in the view that the global economy would "shut down" in the 
event of pandemic influenza.19 This view is speculative in the extreme, and 
indeed it overlooks that fact that in 1918 the global economy demonstrably 
did not skid to a halt. 
Economic impacts of disease can usefully be classified as direct and 
indirect. Direct impacts, which have been widely studied, would include 
hospital costs, lost days of work, costs of medication consumed, and so on. 
In a much-cited piece Meltzer et al. ( 1999) estimated the direct costs of pan-
demic influenza in the United States to be, to an order of magnitude, US$100 
billion, a bit less than 1 percent of gross domestic product. 20 As is usual in 
health impact evaluation studies, the major component of direct costs was 
the present value of future lifetime earnings of persons in the prime working 
ages who died. Much of the labor force impact of pandemic influenza would 
depend on whether excess mortality affected the old and the young, as in 
1957-58 and 1968-69, or those in the prime of life, as in 1918-19; Meltzer 
et al. made the assumption that the old and the young would be most at risk. 
Declining tax revenues and the need for increased expenditure in response to 
the epidemic (both health spending and economic relief to distressed sectors) 
would increase government fiscal deficits. 2 1 
Indirect costs would include the economic multiplier effects of the direct 
costs, plus the results of shifts in the structural parameters governing such 
fundamental economic behavior as consumption. A wide range of such ef-
fects might be expected. Private consumption would be reduced not only as 
a direct result of illness, but also as consumer confidence was reduced and 
demand for precautionary balances rose. Investment might decline along 
with business sentiment; at some point, however, depleted inventories would 
have to be rebuilt. Home bias, that is, the preference for domestic goods and 
assets over foreign ones, would increase, the latter perhaps reducing foreign 
direct investment, which has been the main instrument of global economic 
integration and growth in Asia. Trade would suffer and supply chains would 
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be disrupted. To judge from experience with SARS, the travel, tourism, hotel, 
and restaurant sectors would probably suffer severe losses. There might be 
a global flight to quality, perhaps short-term US government debt, in asset 
markets. The equity premium would everywhere rise, and impacts on cur-
rency markets might be considerable. 
All of these hypothesized macroeconomic impacts augur a significant 
decrease in gross domestic product around the world as a result of a pandemic, 
with some "connected," outward-looking countries faring worse than less 
open ones. 
A number of recent reports have estimated the consequences of pan·-
demic influenza. The Asian Development Bank has considered an Asian 
pandemic with a 20 percent attack rate and a 0.5 percent case-fatality rate 
(Bloom et al. 2005). Depending on how long the psychological shock of 
the pandemic persisted, the Bank estimated an economic impact of about 
2-7 percent of GDP in the region. In New Zealand, the Treasury examined 
a pandemic with a 40 percent attack rate and a 2 percent case-fatality rate, 
concluding that GDP in the year of the event would be reduced by 5-10 per-
cent (Douglas et al. 2006) . Of interest in both siin ulations is that the demand 
effect mediated through consumer and investor behavior is held to be much 
stronger than the direct supply side effect, most of the latter due to lost days 
of work. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2006) estimated that, 
on the assumption that 30 percent of all US workers became ill, 2.5 percent 
died, and those who survived missed three weeks of work, US GDP would 
decline by 5 percent. McKibben and Sidorenko (2006) estimated that a mild 
pandemic might reduce global output by 1 percent, while a very serious one 
on the scale of 1 918-20 might reduce it by 10 percent. 
The example of SARS, especially its iinpacts on the region most affected, 
Southeast Asia, should provide some indication of what consequences pan-
demic influenza might have.22 In a report published in mid-2003 (Fan 2003 ), 
the Asian Development Bank examined two cases, a SARS epidemic last-
ing one fiscal quarter and a SARS epidemic lasting two quarters. In the first 
case, the 2003 annual GDP growth rate was estiinated to be reduced by 0.4 
percentage points against a no-epidemic baseline in East Asia (China, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Taiwan) and by 0.5 percentage points in Southeast Asia 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). A two-quarter 
epidemic was estimated to reduce annual GDP growth by 1.0 percentage point 
in East Asia and 1.4 percentage points in Southeast Asia. Lee and McKibbin 
(2004) estimated that SARS would reduce GDP in China by 1 percent in 2003 
(the epidemic emerged in November 2002) if economic agents expected the 
epidemic to be short-term, but by over twice that if such agents expected that 
it would persist (diminishing steadily) over ten years. It is an open question 
whether the impact of SARS-a new disease for which authorities were en-
tirely unprepared-on expectations and confidence would be greater or less 
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than the impact of pandemic influenza. SARS resolved itself quickly, whereas 
pandemic influenza would remain in the headlines month after month, with 
depressingly high mortality and morbidity. 
Switching to a microeconomic perspective, the impact on GDP per 
capita is open to debate: it would depend on the age profile of mortality and 
morbidity and on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. 23 
The instantaneous reduction in the labor force as a result of the pandemic 
would lead to an increase in capital per worker and a corresponding increase 
in wages and decline in the rate of return to capital. 24 In a simple neoclassical 
model, characterized by diminishing marginal returns, an exogenous saving 
rate, and an exogenous rate of total factor productivity growth, the invest-
ment required to maintain the higher capital-output ratio would exceed 
available savings. Therefore the capital-output ratio would gradually decline 
to its baseline value (and the wage rate along with it). The process of shock 
and re-equilibration would consist of an immediate increase in output per 
worker, followed by negative growth as the capital-output ratio returned to 
its equilibrium value, following which there would be no impact on the long-
run equilibrium rate of growth. 
Even in a simple model, however, a number of factors could complicate 
the picture. An increase in household demand for precautionary balances 
might offset the decline in public savings, so the overall effect on savings is 
indeterminate. If the aggregate saving rate increased, the long-term equilib-
rium capital-output ratio would be increased, and vice versa in the case of a 
decline. Effects of pandemic mortality on the age structure might influence 
the household saving rate by changing the ratio of persons in the main saving 
age bracket (20-64 years) to those in the main dis-saving age bracket (65+ 
years) . The age profile of excess mortality would also, as mentioned above, 
affect age-based transfer systems (pensions and health) . 
A medium-term shift in the rate of population growth would also 
mean that the capital-output ratio would not return to its original equilib-
rium. Finally, the simple neoclassical model is one in which prices adjust to 
instantly clear markets. In a macroeconomic context, where wages, interest 
rates, and commodity prices are likely to be sticky, additional impacts of the 
type described above, often with a significant role of expectations, would be 
possible. 
Even laying aside the claim by Murray et al. (2007) that mortality and 
morbidity would be greatest in the developing world, it seems likely that eco-
nomic impacts in low-income countries would be especially severe. Schultz 
(1964) found that the 1918-20 pandemic significantly increased output per 
worker in the agricultural labor force in India. However, it is the household, 
not the worker, that is of most interest. Poor households would suffer im-
mediate losses from lost wage income, in addition to which they would be 
forced to sell assets in order to care for the sick. Much research indicates that 
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episodes of illness push families on the brink of poverty into poverty and 
prevent those in poverty from climbing out. 
Because of the many ambiguities, it has proven difficult to apply growth 
theory to estimate with any certainty the economic impact of severe epidem-
ics.25 Brainerd and Siegler (2003) find for the United States that the 1918-20 
pandemic significantly raised (not lowered, as the unadorned neoclassical 
model would suggest) growth of GDP per capita for about a decade after the 
event. Perhaps the concentration of mortality among the most productive 
members of the population (the middle spike of the W) reduced per capita 
income (despite presumably having increased per worker output) and led to 
ill-defined catch-up effects. 
Closing thoughts 
This review began with the question whether the current near-crisis level of 
concern over the likelihood of an influenza pandemic was justified. The range 
of issues raised by pandemic influenza is wide, and different readers may well, 
based on the discussion above, arrive at different answers. For the author, the 
answer is captured by the German colloquialism Jein-yes and no. 
That there will be another pandemic, and perhaps soon, is not in ques-
tion. The key issues are its pathogenicity and its age-attack curve, which are 
difficult if not impossible to predict. A mild pandemic, or one affecting only 
the very young and the very old, even if deadly, will attract relatively little 
attention. On the other hand, a repetition of the 1918-20 W-shaped pattern, 
even if overall pathogenicity is rather mild, will be a severe event. 
Pandemics may be expected, albeit not predicted. The issues raised here 
should not be addressed on the basis of "preparing for the next one," an ap-
proach that is bound to lead to policy fatigue if the looked-for pandemic does 
not emerge soon and to a boom-bust policy cycle if it does. This is especially 
true in the developing world, where pandemic influenza should rather be ad-
dressed as part of a sustained medium-term program for strengthening health 
systems, a win-win option that bears fruit even in the absence of a pandemic. 
Overall rural development, and veterinary health in particular, are key to 
alleviating the problem and, again, can be considered win-win options. The 
scientific arsenal has never been stronger, yet gaps in availability of antiviral 
drugs and vaccines are inevitable and the world is poorly prepared to deal 
with the politics of shortage. Some studies suggest that emerging pandemics 
can be "ring-fenced," but this conclusion is not universally accepted. It is 
agreed, however, that the entire of range of complementary responses, from 
antiviral prophylaxis to social distancing, all targeted to maximize effective-
ness, should be deployed as needed. A theme that cuts across all aspects of 
pandemic influenza is governance (at both the national and global levels), 
which is as important as capacity issues. Governance problems, such as the 
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fragility of health systems, represent structural weaknesses and are not best 
addressed by crisis-mentality preparedness planning. 
Notes 
1 This essay had its origin as the overview 
paper of the workshop "Policy and Social As-
pects of Pandemic Influenza,• held at IIASA 
on 4--5 August 2006. Assistance from Wah-Sui 
Almberg is gratefully acknowledged. General 
background sources on influenza consulted 
include Cox and Bender ( 1995 ), Cox and 
Subbarao (2000), Earn et al. (2002), and Kil-
bourne (1987). 
2 It was once accepted wisdom that pan-
demics occurred in a 10-11-year cycle (which 
fueled concerns over a possible 1976 pande-
mic), but this is now known to be false (Dow-
dle 2006). 
3 A pandemic in 1830- 32 was as deadly, 
in relative terms, as the 1918-20 pandemic. 
4 Some researchers also cite 1946 and 
1977 as years in which relatively minor pan-
demics occurred. 
5 This is an oversimplification: in past 
pandemics susceptibility has varied by age 
group according to exposure to previous in-
fluenza viruses. 
6 H5Nl is, however, not the only candi-
date for causing the next pandemic; Bartlett 
and Hayden (2005) list five avian influenza 
viruses that have caused human infection 
since 1997. Dowdle (2006) is particularly con-
cerned by H2N2. Webby and Webster (2003 : 
1519- 1520) discuss different viral subtypes 
at length. 
7 H5Nl has been found in pigs in China 
and Indonesia; H3N2 is endemic in pigs in the 
region, so the opportunity for reassortment 
with a human-to-human transmissible virus 
exists. 
8 The Writing Committee (2005) adds 
that the most sophisticated assay method, 
the reverse transcriptase polymerase chain 
reaction test for viral RNA, is increasingly 
detecting mild and asymptomatic cases among 
persons in contact with known cases. This 
development contains both good and bad 
news. It suggests that the virus is becoming 
increasingly transmissible from human to 
human, at least at the local level (placing us 
in Phase 4 of the WHO influenza cycle-see 
Figure 1) . However, factoring in mild cases 
would also reduce the elevated case-fatality 
rates estimated to date. 
9 The highly pathogenic H5Nl virus that 
caused deaths in Vietnam in 2004 was ge -
netically distinct from the strain that caused 
deaths in Hong Kong in 1997, suggesting that 
vaccines prepared on the basis of the 1997 
strain are unlikely to be effective against 
today's virus (Horimoto et al. 2004). 
10 The HA protein determines the re-
ceptor preference of the virus. Classic avian 
influenza strains preferentially bind to intesti-
nal epithelial cells of fowl; human pathogenic 
strains such as the 1918 HlNl virus contain 
HA variants that preferentially bind to the 
epithelial cells of the human upper respiratory 
tract (Stevens et al. 2006) . A minor mutation 
of two points on the HA protein array was 
found to be sufficient to revert a strain of the 
1918 virus to a classic avian virus. 
11 The case-fatality rate among US Army 
troops in 1918-20 was 5-10 percent. Mortal-
ity in some sub-populations, for example, the 
population of some Pacific islands, was far 
higher, ranging from 5 percent in Fiji to 20 
percent in Western Samoa (Wilson et aJ. 2005 
for references) . 
12 Another antiviral agent, Relenza, 
has received less attention than it perhaps 
deserves. GSK had shut down production 
capacity for the drug, which is administered 
via a nasal spray, but reopened it under pres -
sure from the international public health 
community. Many countries have increased 
stocks of Relenza to diversify their portfolio 
of responses and as a fallback in the event 
of Tamiflu-resistance. I am indebted to an 
anonymous reviewer for these points. 
13 There was excess influenza mortality 
(i.e. , mortality over that expected in a normal 
year) for the very old and very young as well, 
but enormous excess mortality for young 
adults. 
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14 Bell and Lewis (2004) describe these-
quence of events. The first case was observed 
in Guangdong Province in November 2002. 
Local public health officials downplayed the 
seriousness of the outbreak, and there was 
insufficient information flow between the 
provincial and central levels. In February 
2003 Ministry of Health officials in Beijing 
announced that there had been an outbreak 
of "atypical pneumonia" but that it was under 
control. A physician who publicly disagreed 
was arrested and jailed. By March, SARS was 
recognized as a previously unknown disease 
and was spreading throughout Southeast 
Asia. 
15 Implications of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) for new techniques of vaccine 
development would appear to be the major 
link between intellectual property rights 
and vaccines. A WHO conference concluded 
that, to date, Trade-related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have neither 
stimulated the development of new vaccines 
relevant to the developing world nor reduced 
demand for vaccine in poor countries (Mil-
stein and Kaddar 2006). 
16 Taking account of the potential to 
convert avian influenza vaccine production 
to human vaccine might triple this figure. 
A reviewer commented that this approach, 
much advocated by public health experts, is 
regarded as impractical by the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. 
17 Current practice is to allow reassort-
ment to take place in embryonated chicken 
eggs until the desired genetic profile is ob-
served (Wehby and Webster 2003). These 
strains are then grown, again in embryonated 
chicken eggs, to produce vaccine stocks. There 
are two elements to the time delay. First, 
random reassortment must take place until a 
suitable viral strain emerges. Second, it takes 
time to obtain the needed large number of 
chicken eggs. To make matters worse, the H5 
virus kills chicken embryos, requiring arduous 
measures to produce vaccines. 
18 In September 2005, Dr. David Na-
barro, then the newly named UN coordinator 
for influenza, was sharply criticized by WHO 
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for scaremongering when he warned that 
150 million persons might die. Yet, predic-
tions have ranged from 2 to 360 million, and 
WHO itself commented that there was too 
much uncertainty to choose one number 
over another. Murray et al. (2007) applied 
1918 mortality rates to current population to 
estimate possible mortality of 62 million (their 
median estimate). Provocatively, Murray et al. 
predict that almost all of these deaths would 
be in developing countries. 
19 One of those authors, Osterholm 
(2005b), does not mince words in another 
article: "The global economy would come to a 
halt ... • (Osterholm 2005a: 1840). 
20 Balicer et al. (2005), applying a similar 
approach to Israel, estimated the direct costs 
of pandemic influenza to be 0.5 percent of 
Israel's GDP. 
21 See Bell and Lewis (2004) for a de-
scription of the relief measures instituted 
by Southeast Asian countries in response to 
SARS. 
22 Bell and Lewis (2004) present a cogent 
account of the development of the epidemic, 
its clinical aspects and epidemiological pro-
gression, and the policy response. 
23 This discussion of the neoclassical 
growth model is based on Brainerd and Siegler 
(2003: 8-11). 
24 Bloom and Mahal ( 1997) found no 
impact of the Black Death on land rents, but 
Bell and Lewis (2004) attribute the negative 
finding to small sample size. The latter authors 
are also dismissive of Bloom and Mahal's find-
ing that the 1918-20 influenza pandemic had 
little impact on Indian agricultural output 
(a finding that contradicted earlier work by 
Schultz cited below). The decline in the rate 
of return to capital would be consistent with a 
decline in asset prices-perhaps a steep one for 
housing, where the market might take years 
to adjust to the downward demand shock. 
25 Controversies over the economic 
impact of pandemic influenza parallel con-
troversies over the impact of natural disas-
ters (floods, earthquakes, etc.) on economic 
growth. 
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